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Abstract: This paper sheds light on the current state and the likely future development of 
Korea’s evolving pension system by analyzing it from a comparative perspective. It 
shows that, because of its many institutional layers, the Korean pension system could 
evolve into one of several different types of pension regimes: if the National Pension 
Scheme (NPS) were to continue to be dominant and occupational pensions continued to 
be marginal, a classic Bismarckian system would emerge; if the NPS were to be 
significantly reduced and occupational pensions were to be significantly expanded, a 
Bismarckian-light system would be the outcome; if other changes were to occur—such as 
the conversion of the basic pension into a universal, poverty-preventing pension and the 
partial replacement of the NPS by a mandatory personal or occupational-pension 
scheme—a mixed regime would emerge. The paper argues that the emergence and 
consolidation of a Bismarckian-style, single-pillar system is more likely than the shift to 
one of the variants of the multi-pillar system, such as the Bismarckian-light and the 
mixed regime type. Since there are many sources of path dependence that reinforce the 
Bismarckian path of development, a shift to a different pension regime is very difficult. 
For example, large accumulated entitlements and the strong redistributive role of the NPS 
make it difficult to reduce the public, earnings-related pension program, and significant 
accumulated entitlements and the important role of the severance pay scheme in company 
financing also make it difficult to expand occupational pensions. 
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Résumé: Cet article met en lumière l'état actuel et l'évolution probable du système de 
pension de la Corée à la lumière d’une analyse comparative. Cette dernière suggère qu’en 
raison de ses multiples couches institutionnelles, le système de pension coréen pourrait 
converger vers l'un des régimes de retraite suivants.  Dans le cas où le National Pension 
Scheme (NPS) devait continuer à occuper une position dominante et les régimes de 
pensions privés à jouer un rôle marginal, un système bismarckien classique devrait 
émerger. En revanche, si le place prépondérante du NPS devait être considérablement 
réduite et les fonds de pensions privés significativement élargis, un système bismarckien-
light émergerait. Finalement,  si d'autres changements devaient s’opérer, comme la 
conversion du régime de pension de base en un système universel  de retraite ciblant la 
prévention de la pauvreté et le remplacement partiel du NPS par un régime de retraites 
privés obligatoires, un régime de pension mixte se dégagerait. Cet article soutient que 
l'émergence et la consolidation d’un système bismarckien, c'est-à-dire,  un système à un 
seul pilier est plus probable que l’émergence de l'une des variantes des systèmes à piliers 
multiples, tels que le système bismarckien-light et les systèmes à régimes mixtes. Comme 
il existe de nombreuses sources de « dépendance de sentier » qui renforcent le 
développement d’un régime bismarckien, le passage à un régime de retraite différent 
apparaît très peu probable. Par exemple, le large volume des droits accumulés et le rôle 
redistributif très fort de la NPS rend difficile la réduction du système de pension public 
dont le niveau des prestations est lié aux revenus et aux droits accumulés; de plus le rôle 
important des indemnités de départ dans les finances des entreprises rend également 
difficile l’élargissement des régimes de pensions privés.   2
INTRODUCTION 
 
Pension systems play a central role in welfare states. Public pension plans were, in most 
advanced industrialized countries, the first social program to insure either workers or 
citizens against one of the major social risks in their lives and to cover a large proportion 
of the population. Pension systems thus shaped the development of modern welfare 
states. In addition, since in many OECD countries pensions are the single largest social 
program, accounting for more than 10 percent of GDP, they are one of the biggest items 
in government budgets and thus a key driver of taxes and public expenditures. The role of 
pension systems will become even more important over the next 50 years: because public 
pensions are needed to prevent poverty and provide income security for retirees, 
population aging will lead to a rise in pension expenditures and significant fiscal 
challenges for governments. The study of pensions thus helps to gain insights into the 
emergence and change of welfare states, the politics of social policy, and the policy 
responses to population aging. 
 
The formation and development of Korea’s pension system is truly remarkable: over the 
course of only two decades, governments have created a social insurance program—the 
National Pension Scheme (NPS)—that seeks to provide generous pension benefits to a 
very large proportion of the working population; a basic old-age pension program for 
more than two thirds of citizens; a social assistance program targeted at poor retirees; and 
voluntary, tax-subsidized occupational-pension plans. Despite a rapid expansion of 
coverage and very low pension spending, Korean governments have made major changes   3
to the NPS’ key parameters and thus significantly reduced pension benefits (OECD 
2007b, 73). Most importantly, the 2007 pension reform led to a reduction of the benefit 
level from 60 to 50 percent in 2008 and a reduction from 50 to 40 percent over a 20-year 
period (Kim 2010; Phang 2010). These extraordinary developments—the creation of 
many new pension programs and the retrenchment of only recently created ones—show 
that Korea’s pension system is not fully institutionalized. Key indicators of institutional 
stability—a dominant pension policy paradigm, a permanent set of policy instruments, 
and a broad and stable support coalition—are still lacking. Since Korea’s core program 
was created only about 20 years ago, it has not yet reached maturity: the first cohort that 
will have paid contributions over its entire work career will retire only in 2028. Even 
though NPS coverage was expanded in the 1990s to more than three quarters of the 
working population, the number of beneficiaries, the average pension amount, and annual 
expenditures continue to be very low by international standards. The NPS contribution 
rate of 9 percent of wages is well below the OECD average. Most importantly, the NPS’ 
role in poverty prevention and income security provision is not yet fully determined. To 
conclude, since Korea’s pension system is still in the process of development, the 
division of responsibilities among Korea’s public-pension programs, and the relative 
importance of the state and the market in pension provision, is uncertain. 
 
The Korean pension system is at a crossroads (Kim and Kim 2005; Kwon 2002; Yang 
2004; Moon 2002). Over the course of the next 50 years, it could turn into a single-pillar 
system: public pensions, primarily those provided by the NPS, would guarantee a level of 
income sufficient for replacing most of employees’ income in retirement, and private   4
pensions would not be an important source of income. Alternatively, it could become a 
multi-pillar system: public pensions would keep most pensioners out of poverty, and 
private pensions would top up public ones. If they combined public and private income 
sources, middle- and higher-income workers would likely be able to maintain their 
standard of living in retirement. If Korea chose the single-pillar route, it would most 
likely follow the path of Austria, France, Germany, and Italy. In these Bismarckian 
countries, large public pensions provide income security even for employees with 
medium and high earnings. If Korea chose the multi-pillar route, it would most likely 
follow the path of Canada and the United States. In these Bismarckian-light countries 
(Weaver 2004), earnings-related public-pension schemes replace only a small portion of 
medium and high earnings and thus leave a gap that personal and occupational pensions 
are expected to fill. The implications of following either the single-pillar or the multi-
pillar path for benefit levels and contribution rates can be illustrated by a brief 
comparison of Germany and Canada (in the early 2000s): the German Statutory Pension 
Insurance—the first Bismarckian scheme in the industrialized world—provided, up until 
its transformation in 2001, benefits of close to 70 percent of wages for average earners, 
had a contribution rate of about 20 percent of wages, and received funds from general 
revenue to pay for non-contributory benefits such as child-care credits. The Canada/ 
Quebec Pension Plan, a “Bismarckian-light” program, provided benefits of 25 percent for 
average earners, had a contribution rate of about 10 percent, and used surpluses for 
building up a significant reserve fund.   
   5
In many advanced industrialized countries including Korea, recent pension reform 
debates have focused on the fiscal necessity and political feasibility of transforming 
Bismarckian pension systems into multi-pillar ones (World Bank 1994; Myles and 
Pierson 2001; Holzmann et al. 2003). Both the World Bank and the OECD urged the 
Korean government to cut the level of NPS benefits drastically and to convert the existing 
severance pay program into mandatory occupational pensions (World Bank 2000; OECD 
2001). The World Bank found the replacement rate of the NPS “extremely high by 
international standards” (World Bank 2000, 12) and warned that the contribution rate 
increase required for financing the costs generated by population aging would “almost 
double the taxes of labor in Korea” (World Bank 2000, 18). It recommended that the 
contribution rate be kept at the present level of 9 percent and that the benefit level be cut 
in half. In addition, the World Bank argued that a move towards a multi-pillar system was 
feasible: the NPS “[i]s still immature and the debt owed to those that have contributed 
since 1988 is still manageable. A shift to a system less dependent on the state and on high 
payroll taxes on future generations can still be made comfortably” (World Bank 2000, 
50). Since it seems to be easy to make a regime shift, Korea is an exception among 
Bismarckian OECD countries: in Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the 
United States, a large-scale privatization of pensions is extremely difficult (Myles and 
Pierson 2001). 
 
By analyzing Korea’s experience from a comparative perspective, this paper seeks to 
shed light on the current state and the likely future development of its evolving pension 
system. It is divided into three sections: the first section analyzes the institutional design   6
of the Korean system and identifies models of pension provision that could emerge from 
it; the second section reviews three key sources of path dependence—ideas, interests, and 
institutions—and examines their role in stabilizing the Korean pension system; the third 
section studies the effects of different pension reform choices on path dependence and 
draws lessons from the experiences of Bismarckian OECD countries. This paper 
concludes that the Korean pension system is more likely to evolve into a single-pillar 
system than into a multi-pillar one. Thus, in about 50 years, it will likely look more like 
the German and Austrian pension systems than like the Canadian and American ones. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF PENSION SYSTEMS 
 
Despite uncertainties regarding the development of Korea’s pension system, one can gain 
a better understanding by comparing its institutional design to that of existing pension 
regime types. In this section, the following four typologies of pension regimes will be 
used: (1) Esping-Andersen’s classification consisting of corporative state-dominated 
insurance systems, residualist systems, and universalistic state-dominated systems; (2) 
Korpi and Palme’s classification made up of targeted, voluntary state-subsidized, 
corporatist, basic security, and encompassing systems; (3) Weaver’s classification 
consisting of notional defined contribution, Bismarckian, Bismarckian-light, universal, 
residualist, and mixed systems; and (4) the OECD’s classification of pension systems 
which takes into account several key institutional features and economic indicators 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998; Weaver 2004; OECD 2007b). It should   7
be noted that almost all pension regimes are ideal types and that many pension systems 
have elements from more than one type. A striking example is Japan’s pension system: it 
blends two of Esping-Andersen’s regime types—the corporative state-dominate insurance 
system and the residualist system (Esping-Andersen 1997). In addition, it should be noted 
that pension regime typologies are most useful for analyzing future scenarios of Korea’s 
pension system and, since they were developed for well-established pension systems, 
provide an only partial picture of the current state of Korea’s emerging and immature 
system. 
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State and Market in Pension Provision 
 
Esping-Andersen’s typology of pension systems is a mirror image of his well-known 
classification of liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare regimes. It takes two 
crucial features of pension systems into account: first, the relative role of the state and 
market in pension provision and, second, the degree to which certain occupational 
groups, especially civil servants, enjoy better retirement income security than the 
majority of workers or citizens. The role of the family in pension provision—which is 
still very large in Korea (Moon 2008, 3)—is not a key criterion in this typology since the 
maturation of public and private-pension programs are expected to marginalize both 
family transfers and other traditional forms of old-age poverty relief. In residualist 
systems, which exist mostly in liberal welfare states such as the United States and 
Canada, both private and public programs play an important role in retirement income 
security, and civil servant privileges are largely absent. In corporative state-dominated 
systems, which are typical of the Germany and France’s conservative welfare states, 
public-pension programs have a dominant role and grant strong status privileges to civil 
servants. In universalistic state-dominated systems, which exist in Sweden and Norway’s 
social democratic welfare states, the state is also a dominant source of retirement income 
but does not provide special pensions to civil servants. 
 
The Korean pension system is most similar to the corporativist state-dominated ideal 
type. The NPS was designed to be the dominant pillar of old-age security: it promises 
high replacement rates for workers with long contribution histories and covers almost the   9
entire working population, including self-employed persons. Occupational pensions and 
private retirement savings play only a small role in the Korean system. Companies are 
encouraged to convert their severance pay schemes into occupational-pension plans but, 
so far, only few have made this change (Phang 2010). In 2008, company pension plans 
covered less than 4 percent of the workforce (OECD 2008, 145). Korean civil servants 
have special pension schemes and get much higher retirement benefits than private sector 
workers (Bae 2010). Even though Korea seems to fit the corporativist type well, it could 
eventually become more similar to the residualist one. Since the NPS is maturing only 
very slowly—about half of retirees will not receive benefits until 2030 (Moon 2008, 4)—
and the benefits from the new basic pension program—which is supposed to compensate 
for the long transition to a fully mature NPS—are very low, there is a significant gap in 
retirement income provision. If tax-subsidized occupational pensions were to fill this gap 
sooner than public programs, the market would gain weight and the state would likely 
lose its dominant role. Thus, a hybrid system that combines elements from both the 
corporativist state-dominated and the residualist regime types is a possible outcome in 
Korea. 
  
Flat-Rate and Earnings-Related Pension Benefits 
 
Korpi and Palme’s corporatist and encompassing regime types are closely related to 
Esping-Andersen’s corporativist and universalistic state-dominated models (see Table 1). 
The two main criteria for classifying pension systems are the principle for calculating 
benefits and the basis of eligibility. In the corporatist type, benefits are related to   10
earnings, and eligibility depends on both employment status and occupational group 
membership; in the encompassing type, there is not only an earnings-related program for 
employees but also a flat-rate program for citizens. Korpi and Palme’s targeted, voluntary 
state-subsidized, and basic security models are variants of Esping-Andersen’s residualist 
regime type. Of these residualist variants, only the basic security type is relevant for 
understanding the Korean case: benefits are low and are either at a flat rate or are related 
to earnings, and eligibility is based on either citizenship or employment. Unlike the 
corporatist and encompassing types, the basic security model seeks to prevent poverty 
only; income security in retirement, especially for high-income groups, is a private 
responsibility. 
 
The Korean pension system shares many features with the corporatist model and a few 
with the basic security and encompassing models. The NPS is an earnings-related 
program for employees, but its benefits are in part related to average earnings in the 
economy: all employees with 40 years of contributions can expect to receive a pension at 
least as high as 30 percent of the average wage (OECD 2007a, 119). Since the program 
redistributes funds from higher-income groups to lower-income ones, it provides a basic 
level of security for all workers. In addition, the new basic old-age pension, which 
complements the NPS’ basic protection, is similar to a citizenship pension: it covers 
about 70 percent of retirees and excludes only high-income earners. If the replacement 
rate of the NPS were to stay at a high level, and basic pension benefits were to grow, 
Korea’s pension system would become more similar to the encompassing system; if the   11
level of NPS benefits were to decline significantly, and basic pension benefits were to 
stay low, Korea would become more similar to the basic security model. 
 
Replacement Rates in Bismarckian Pension Systems 
 
Weaver’s classification is useful for analyzing the development of pension regime types 
from the 1950s to the 2000s and for understanding the structural changes in OECD 
countries that have led to regime shifts. It shows that the Bismarckian and Bismarckian-
light types—which provide public, earnings-related pensions with high and low 
replacement rates, respectively—are the most stable pension regimes. Austria, France, 
and Germany are examples of the Bismarckian type, and Canada and the United States 
are examples of the Bismarckian-light one. Two new types emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s: the mixed type which has a mandatory or opt-out occupational-pension tier and a 
relatively small public tier, and the notional defined contribution (NDC) type, which 
provides contribution-related benefits and relies mostly on pay-as-you-go financing. 
Sweden and Italy are two examples of the NDC type. Two other types—the universal 
type which provides only flat-rate benefits, and the residual type which has only a small, 
targeted public-pension program—have almost ceased to exist and are thus no longer 
important for an analysis of future developments in pension systems. 
 
Since the NPS is an earnings-related social insurance program with high replacement 
rates, Korea’s pension system is most similar to the Bismarckian regime type. But if the 
NPS’s benefit level were to decline significantly, the Korean system could turn into a   12
Bismarckian-light regime. This would most likely occur if the contribution rate were to 
be limited to a relatively low level of between 10 and 15 percent of wages, which is the 
approximate range in Bismarckian-light pension systems. In 2009, the contribution rate 
was 9.9 percent in the Canada/ Quebec Pension Plan and 12.4 percent in the U.S. Social 
Security program. The NDC system presents another scenario for the Korean system. If 
the level of NPS benefits were to be reduced to a near-adequate level for income security, 
and either private or occupational programs were to fill an only small gap in pension 
provision, Korea’s pension system could become more similar either to Sweden and 
Italy’s NDC regimes or to Germany’s pension system which was recently converted from 
a Bismarckian system into a quasi-NDC system with a quasi-mandatory private pension 
pillar (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2006; Hering 2004). 
 
Redistributive and Insurance Tiers in Pension Regimes 
 
The OECD has developed a real-world typology that allows for a comprehensive and 
unambiguous categorization of pension systems in advanced industrialized countries. 
Unlike the other classifications, the OECD’s does not define pension regime types—it 
analyzes the structure of pension systems. It differentiates between two tiers: a public, 
redistributive tier with universal coverage, and a mandatory insurance tier, which is either 
public or private or both. The goals of the first and second tiers are, respectively, the 
prevention of poverty in old age and the maintenance of an adequate income after 
retirement. The first tier includes targeted pension programs and basic pension programs; 
the second tier includes defined benefit (DB), notional defined contribution (NDC), and   13
defined contribution (DC) programs. In addition, the OECD measures the key 
parameters—such as the benefit levels, contribution rates, retirement ages, and coverage 
rates—of the first and second tiers. The OECD’s classification is thus a very useful 
complement to other pension-regime typologies and especially to Weaver’s classification. 
 








 Targeted  Basic  Public  Private 
Korea   30 DB   
Bismarckian       
Austria 28   DB   
France 32   DB   
Germany 19   DB   
NDC       
Italy 22   NDC   
Sweden 34   NDC  DB,  DC 
Bismarckian-light       
Canada 17 14 DB   
United States  22   DB   
Mixed       
Australia  25   DC 
Denmark 18 18   DC 
Japan   16 DB   
Netherlands   31   DB 
Switzerland 24   DB  DB 
United Kingdom  15 15 DB   
 
Source: OECD 2007b, Table I.1., I.2.   14
Regarding its structure, the Korean pension system is most similar to the Bismarckian 
systems in Austria, France, and Germany and to the Bismarckian-light systems in the 
United States and Canada: it has a first tier for preventing poverty and a public, second 
tier that provides income security and operates on the defined benefit principle (see Table 
2). The OECD considers the NPS both as a first tier and as a second tier program: it has 
classified the portion of NPS benefits that is based on average, economy-wide earnings as 
a basic, first tier pension, and the portion that is based on life-time, individual earnings as 
a public, second tier pension.  The replacement rate of the first tier program is as high in 
Korea as it is in Austria, France, and Canada, and is higher in Korea than it is in Germany 
and the United States. The overall replacement rate of the NPS is higher than the OECD 
mean at most levels, which range from half to two times average earnings (see Table 3). 
The Korean pension system is most similar to the German and French Bismarckian 
systems: the replacement rates at average or above-average earnings are at similar levels; 
because of the NPS’ large redistributive component, the replacement rates at below 
average earnings are significantly higher in Korea than in either Germany or France. The 
NPS provides lower benefits than the very generous Bismarckian system in Austria but 
higher ones than the Bismarckian-light systems in the United States and Canada. It is 
difficult to compare Korea to countries with either NDC or mixed systems. Since the 
OECD’s replacement rate calculations include both public- and mandatory private-
pension benefits, it is not possible to compare Korea’s state-dominated pension system to 
the public, earnings related programs in countries—such as Australia, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—that have either NDC or mixed systems and also 
mandatory or quasi-mandatory personal or occupational-pensions tiers. However, a   15
comparison of the Korean system to mixed regimes with voluntary occupational 
pensions—such as the United Kingdom’s and Japan’s—suggests that the NPS likely 
provides more generous benefits than public-pension programs in most non-Bismarckian 
countries. 
 
Table 3  Net Replacement Rates by Earnings Level in OECD Pension Systems 
 
  Individual earnings, multiple of mean 
 0.5  0.75 1 1.5 2
Korea 106  83 72 62 51
Bismarckian       
Austria 90  91 91 89 66
France 78  65 63 58 55
Germany 53  57 58 59 44
NDC       
Italy 82  78 78 78 79
Sweden 81  69 64 72 74
Bismarckian-light       
Canada 89  68 57 40 31
United States  67  58 52 48 43
M i x e d        
Australia 84  66 56 46 41
Denmark 133  102 87 77 72
Japan 53  44 39 34 31
Netherlands 97  104 97 96 95
Switzerland 75  68 64 46 35
United Kingdom  66  49 41 31 24
       
OECD average  84  74 70 65 61
 
Source: OECD 2007b, 35.   16
It should be noted that Korea has neither a mandatory occupational-pension tier—which 
exists in Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—nor many voluntary 
personal or occupational-pension schemes like Britain, Canada, and the United States do. 
Even though the mandatory severance pay program in Korea functions in part as a 
retirement scheme, the OECD does not classify it as an occupational-pension program. If 
many companies were to convert their severance schemes into occupational-pension 
plans (Phang 2010), the Korean pension system could become a variant of the mixed 
pension regime type: the contribution rate of Korea’s severance pay program—about 8.3 
percent wages—is similar to the contribution rate of voluntary or mandatory 
occupational-pension programs—about 9 percent of wages—in Australia, Britain, 
Canada, and the United States (OECD 2007b, 77). If Korean occupational-pension plans 
were to be made mandatory or quasi-mandatory, they would likely cover more than 90 
percent of employees, and if they were to continue to be voluntary, they could possibly, 
in the long term, reach a coverage rate of between 40 and 50 percent. 
 
To conclude, the review of four pension regime typologies showed that Korea’s pension 
system is most similar to the Bismarckian regime type, which is a variant of the 
corporatist and corporative state-dominated types (see Table 1). The analysis of the 
OECD’s replacement-rate projections provided support for this categorization. Even 
though it is likely that the Korean system will continue to follow the Bismarckian path, a 
regime shift is a possibility: significant retrenchment of the NPS and an expansion of the 
new basic old-age pension would lead to a shift to the basic security regime type and 
specifically to this type’s Bismarckian-light variant; an expansion of occupational-  17
pension schemes would make the Korean pension system more similar to the mixed 
systems which exist both in countries with a residualist regime, such as Australia and the 
United Kingdom, and in those with a universalist state-dominated regime, such as 
Denmark and the Netherlands. A shift from the Bismarckian system to either the classic 
residualist regime, which existed in Australia before the 1990s, or the classic 
encompassing regime, which continues to exist in Norway, is very unlikely—the former 
because of strong opposition to radical retrenchment and the latter because of strong 
fiscal pressures generated by rapid population aging. 
 
 
SOURCES OF PATH DEPENDENCE IN PENSION SYSTEMS 
 
Since several institutional outcomes are possible, one cannot predict with certainty the 
Korean system’s path of development. However, one can examine the key factors that 
influence the development of pension systems and lead either to path dependence or to 
regime shifts. In addition, one can draw lessons from the experiences of other advanced 
industrialized countries. Even though history rarely repeats itself, an analysis of stability 
and change in foreign pension systems allows one to assess the likelihood of different 
scenarios. This section reviews three important sources of path dependence and regime 
shifts—ideas, interests, and institutions—illustrates their effects with examples from 
other OECD countries, and discusses implications for the Korean pension system. 
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Ideas of Income Security and Poverty Prevention 
 
Ideas and principles are key drivers of stability and change in modern welfare states (Cox 
2004; Béland 2005; Schmidt 2000; Peng and Wong 2008). In addition, they were one of 
the main reasons for the emergence of three different welfare regimes—the liberal, the 
conservative, and the social-democratic ones—in OECD countries (Esping-Andersen 
1990). The ideas regarding the relative weight of the state and the market played an 
important role in the development of pension systems (Myles 1989). In the 1950s and 
1960s, policymakers in Bismarckian countries—such as Germany, Austria, and Italy—
decided that public, earnings-related pension programs should provide a high 
replacement rate so that public pensions enable workers to enjoy the same standard of 
living in retirement that they had during their employment years. Policymakers regarded 
private pensions, both personal and occupational, as only a desirable but mostly 
unnecessary supplement to generous public pensions. A high replacement rate required a 
high contribution rate: in Germany, for example, the target replacement rate of 80 percent 
of gross wages required, in 1957, a contribution rate of 14 percent. For almost 50 years, 
the Bismarckian pension programs in continental Europe crowded out the private 
pensions market because of key decisions regarding the benefit level and the contribution 
rate. Canadian and American policymakers held different ideas than German, Austrian 
and Italian ones. In Canada, policymakers did not want that earnings-related public 
pensions be a full replacement of workers’ income in their retirement years; their goal 
was to provide a basic retirement income and thus only a dependable foundation for old-
age income security. Policymakers who wanted to preserve sufficient room for voluntary,   19
occupational pensions advocated a replacement rate of only 20 percent of wages; those 
who favored a stronger role of the state proposed a benefit level of 30 percent (Simeon 
1972). The compromise solution was 25 percent of wages, and this level has been 
maintained since the 1960s. Policymakers had limited goals in the United States as well: 
even though they gradually increased the level of Social Security benefits between the 
1940s and 1970s, they did not want to achieve a level that would be sufficient for income 
maintenance (Derthick 1979). Social Security’s main guiding principles were the 
prevention of poverty and the provision of a secure basis for an adequate retirement 
income. Both in Canada and in the United States, occupational pensions filled the gap left 
by the public system and thus became an essential component of their pension systems 
(Sass 2006). 
 
The dominant ideas at the program level—income security or poverty prevention—are 
critical factors in the long-term development of pension systems. Since the founding 
ideas and principles define both policy goals and limits, they leave a legacy that is 
difficult to change (Hall 1993). For example, when German policymakers sought to 
transform the Bismarckian pension system into a quasi-NDC system, they had to find a 
solution that would allow them to depart from the pension program’s goal of income 
security without giving up this long-standing principle. They found the following one: 
after the reform, public pensions were to provide benefits that would be close to the 
income security level; newly introduced quasi-mandatory private pensions were to 
compensate for the reduction of public-pension benefits. Thus, future retirees were able 
to expect a pension income from public and private sources that would be at least as high   20
as the benefits that the public program had previously provided. Another example is the 
attempt in the 1970s to increase the replacement rate of the Canada/ Quebec Pension Plan 
significantly (Banting 1985). Even though the contribution rate was at a low level and 
thus could have easily been doubled, it was not possible to build a coalition among the 
federal and provincial governments for a change of the plan’s purpose. The founding idea 
of preserving plenty of room for occupational pensions prevailed. In 2009, in a new 
debate on expanding public pensions in Canada, options for creating a supplementary 
plan, which were to cover only workers who did not have an occupational-pension plan, 
were discussed (Ambachtsheer 2008; Chase and Carmichael 2009) but the option of an 
across-the-board increase of the level of Canada/ Quebec Pension Plan benefits was not 
put on the agenda. The original idea of providing basic security continued to be dominant 
in Canadian pension policy. 
 
The German and Canadian experiences suggest that the founding ideas and principles 
matter more than ideas introduced at a later point in time. Core ideas formulated and 
institutionalized in the early stages of development can influence and constrain the long-
term development of the entire retirement income system. It is likely that these 
experiences will be repeated in the Korean case. In the Korean pension system, the 
principle of income security was important much earlier than the idea of poverty 
prevention. The civil servants’ pension programs, which had been introduced in the 
1960s, were designed to be generous earnings-related programs: they provided a high 
level of benefits and thus enabled public employees to maintain their living standards in 
retirement without having to rely on private savings. In the late 1980s, the principle of   21
income security was applied to the NPS, which initially promised a replacement rate of 
70 percent after only 40 years of work. Income security has thus been a long-standing 
idea in Korean pension policy. Even though the Korean government has made the 
decision to gradually reduce the NPS’ replacement rate from 70 percent to 40 percent 
over the next 20 years, public-pension benefits will continue to be quite high. In addition, 
since the implementation of benefit retrenchment will be completed only in 2028, a 
reversal is possible—it would require only increases of the benefit accrual and the 
pension-contribution rate. Since the Korean economy is expected to continue growing, 
voters’ demands for adequate, earnings-related pensions will likely become much 
stronger than they were at the time when the decisions to reduce the NPS’ replacement 
rate were made. The experiences of many OECD countries have shown that voters’ 
demands for better pensions lead either to a generous public-pension program or to a 
mandatory or quasi-mandatory occupational-pension pillar (Myles and Pierson 2001). 
Since income security was one the NPS’ founding ideas, the Korean pension system is 
more likely to follow the former path than the latter one. 
 
Interests of Middle- and High-Income Earners 
 
Interests and coalitions are important causal mechanisms of path dependence and regime 
shifts in welfare states (Baldwin 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998; Esping-Andersen 1990; 
Pierson 1994). There are at least three sources of support for welfare state programs: first, 
the founders of a social program, including political parties, civil servants, and interest 
groups; second, the beneficiaries of a social program, especially workers and pensioners;   22
and third, previous opponents that have turned into supporters. Since existing 
institutions—and the ideas and principles embedded in them—shape the interests and 
ideas of individuals and organizations, actors can over time change their positions: 
political parties that originally opposed a program’s creation can become its supporters, 
and citizens who derive relatively small benefits from a program can become important 
partners in its support coalition. For example, even though the Swedish conservative 
parties had voted against the introduction of a public, earnings-related pension program 
in the 1950s (Heclo 1974), they were part of a coalition for saving it in the 1990s. 
Another example is the role Canadian high-income earners played in pension reforms: in 
the debates on reforming the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan in the 1990s, they did not 
demand the partial privatization of public, earnings-related pensions—which replace only 
a small percentage of their earnings—and did not oppose a large increase of the 
contribution rate from 5.6 to 9.9 percent. They thus became part of a broad coalition for 
reform that also included the main beneficiaries of the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan: 
low- and middle-income earners. 
 
The interests of middle- and high-income earners are a key factor in the development of 
pension systems: the more they support a program, the more likely is the latter’s 
maintenance and expansion (Korpi and Palme 1998). Which kinds of pension programs 
do these groups support? The following three design features of pension systems are 
important determinants of middle class support: (1) eligibility rules, (2) the degree of 
redistribution, and (3) replacement rates. The first condition is the rules for benefit 
qualification: if a program targets low-income groups, it rarely receives strong support   23
from middle- and high-income groups; if a program covers either all citizens or all 
workers, it receives support from a broad coalition that cuts across high- and low-income 
groups. The second important feature is the degree of redistribution in universal or 
employment-based pension programs (Myles 1989): if a program provides flat-rate 
benefits and thus produces a high degree of redistribution, it is less likely to be supported 
by middle- and high-income groups; if a program provides benefits that are related to 
individual earnings and thus produces a low degree of redistribution, it is more likely to 
be backed by these groups. The third important condition is the replacement rate of 
earnings-related programs for middle- and high-income groups: if a program guarantees a 
replacement rate that is sufficient for income security even at medium and high income 
levels, it generates a broad support coalition; if it provides income security only for low 
income groups, it creates only a narrow support base.  
 
The Austrian earnings-related pension scheme is an example of a program that leads to a 
commonality of interests among low-, middle-, and high-income groups: it provides 
almost universal coverage, limits redistribution in the earnings-related program, and 
replaces a very large portion of income even at high levels. Employees who earn twice 
the average wage in the economy can expect a net replacement rate of about two thirds of 
their income—a level that is more than sufficient for income security. Even though the 
Austrian pension system was reformed many times in the 1990s and 2000s, it has not 
deviated from its path: since its new goal is to guarantee a replacement rate of 80 percent 
of earnings after 45 years of work, income security continues to be its key principle. 
Initiatives by conservative governments to partially privatize retirement income security   24
failed because of massive citizens’ protests. The United States’ Social Security program 
is an example of a program that produced a weak support coalition: it has a high coverage 
rate, redistributes funds from higher- to lower-income groups, and replaces only a 
relatively small proportion of earnings at higher income levels. Thus, middle- and high-
income Americans cannot depend on the public, earnings-related program for their 
income security needs and are simultaneously required to fund a portion of low-income 
earners’ pensions. The weak support of middle- and especially high-income Americans 
explains in part why the long-term funding problems of Social Security, which could be 
solved by only a small increase of the contribution rate, have not been addressed. 
Because of resistance to tax increases, especially from middle- and high-income earners, 
the Social Security contribution rate has not been raised since the early 1980s (Weaver 
2004). 
 
What are the support bases of the Korean pension system? Between the mid-1990s and 
the late 2000s, the actors who contributed to either the founding or the expansion of the 
NPS and the new basic pension program—the civil servants in the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, the Democratic Party, trade unions, and civil society groups—were the most 
important support base. The Welfare Ministry was strongly committed to the NPS, trade 
unions, and civil society groups were both defenders of earnings-related pensions and 
advocates of a better basic pension (Kwon 2003; Yang 2004; Kim 2008; Hwang 2007; 
Bateman 2007). Political parties in Korea have so far played a smaller role than in other 
OECD countries (Kim and Kim 2005; Choi 2008) but their support for, and influence on, 
the NPS and the basic pension program is likely to grow: the expansion and defense of   25
public pensions is a credit-claiming opportunity in electoral contests that political parties 
cannot afford to miss. This has been the experience of Austrian, French, and German 
political parties, for example. In 2007, competition between the Democratic Party and the 
Grand National Party had a positive impact on the introduction of the Korean basic 
pension (Hwang 2009; Moon 2008); it is likely that party competition will play an 
expansive and defensive role also in future rounds of pension reform. The level of 
support from beneficiaries in Korea’s maturing pension system is not yet as high as it is 
in most long-established pension programs. But since the number of NPS beneficiaries 
and near-beneficiaries has been increasing, and since a large proportion of the workforce 
has been paying contributions to this program, one can expect that many workers would 
defend their entitlements to future benefits if a government were to attempt a partial 
privatization of the NPS. 
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NDC    
Italy 3 370
Sweden 13 132
Bismarckian light     
United States  41 290
Canada 87 96






United Kingdom  81 115
    
OECD average  37 189
 
Source: OECD 2007b, 45, Table I.2.  
 
Note: The progressivity index ranges from 0 (pure flat-rate scheme) to 100 (pure 
earnings-related scheme)   27
A crucial determinant of the NPS’ stability will be the degree of support from middle- 
and high-income Koreans. In the 1990s and 2000s, these groups depended on the NPS 
and other public programs because occupational pensions were largely lacking. But this 
could change over the next decades. If most middle- and higher income workers were to 
be covered by occupational-pension plans, they would likely find the NPS increasingly 
less attractive both because of its progressive benefit structure and because of its 
insufficient replacement rate for workers with high incomes. Unlike the earnings-related 
pension programs in classic Bismarckian countries such as Austria, France, Germany, 
and Italy, the NPS leads to a high degree of redistribution (see Table 4). As shown in the 
OECD’s data, the Korean benefit formula is very progressive: the progressivity index—
which ranges from 0 in a pure flat-rate program to 100 in a pure earnings-related one—
was 55 in Korea and thus about twice as high as it was in Austria, France, and Germany. 
Even though the NPS’ replacement rate was relatively high for middle-income earners, it 
was barely adequate for high-income ones (see Table 3). The 2007 pension reform 
reduced the NPS’ adequacy for high-income earners further (Moon 2009, 16). The 
replacement rate for high-income earners is to a large extent determined by a program’s 
ceiling on pensionable earnings: in Korea and most other OECD countries, high-income 
workers are liable to pay pension contributions only up to an earnings ceiling and thus do 
not earn entitlements to benefits on the portion of their wages that exceeds this limit. 
Thus, if the ceiling on pensionable earnings is low, high-income workers depend on 
private-pension provision to meet their need for income security. The NPS’ ceiling was 
160 percent of average earnings, which was below the OECD average of about 190 
percent but similar to the Austrian and German ceilings (see Table 4). But since the   28
Korean ceiling was not indexed to wage growth (Moon 2009, 16), its magnitude relative 
to average wages is expected to decline over the next decades. This would increase the 
dependency of middle- and high-income groups on private-pension provision, likely 
diminish their support for the NPS, and thus weaken the broad coalition among workers 
with low, medium, and high incomes. 
 
Institutional Constraints on Change 
 
Since institutional rules of pension systems create incentives and constraints for 
policymakers and thus limit reform options, they are key determinants of path 
dependence and regime shifts in pension systems (Weaver 2003; Bonoli 2000; Myles and 
Pierson 2001). The classic example of path dependence in pension systems is the 
difficulty of shifting from a public, pay-as-you-go program to a private, funded pension 
system. Since younger workers would have to pay both for the entitlements that have 
been earned by older workers and for the contributions to their own retirement funds, 
they would face a double-payment problem. Thus, once a pay-as-you-go pension 
program has been created, it is difficult to abolish: new entitlements are established 
because current contributions from employers and employees are used to pay for the 
pensions of current retirees. An excellent example of the institutional constraints in a 
mature pension system is the Bush administration’s 2005 proposal for the partial 
privatization of Social Security: even though only 2 percent of the Social Security 
contribution rate was to be diverted to individual accounts, this measure would have 
created a financing gap of $4.5 trillion over two decades (Orzag 2005, 15). These   29
enormous transition costs were one of the main reasons for the failure of this reform 
initiative. In the 1980s, the Thatcher government’s unsuccessful attempt to abolish the 
UK’s new earnings-related pension program showed that it is difficult to change even an 
immature pay-as-you-go pension scheme (Pierson 1994). The problem of high transition 
costs makes difficult not only the shift from public to private programs but also the 
integration of special civil servants’ schemes into a general, earnings-related program. 
The German case illustrates these challenges of integration well: civil servants have 
separate, unfunded pension schemes that are financed from the revenues of the federal, 
state, and local governments; if they were to join the general earnings-related pension 
program, German governments would need both to continue to finance existing pension 
entitlements from current tax revenues and to contribute to the general public-pension 
program. Since this would create a significant fiscal burden, governments have not yet 
attempted to integrate civil servants in the general public-pension scheme 
(Sachverständigenrat Wirtschaft 2001, 161). The double-payment problem plays a role 
not only in the restructuring of public-pension programs but also in the conversion of 
occupational pensions from book reserve schemes—which are an important internal 
source of corporate financing—to externally funded pension plans: companies that want 
to convert their plans need to honor past pension commitments and to make contributions 
to a new funded program.  
 
Another example of the effects of institutional constraints is a shift from a partially 
redistributive program to a pure earnings-related one. Many public earnings-related 
pension programs have one or more rules that produce redistribution: they give credits for   30
periods of child care, military service, unemployment, and education; they provide 
minimum pensions for people with low incomes or short work histories; and they have 
benefit formulas that ensure high replacement rates for below-average income earners. In 
most earnings-related programs, redistributive benefits are financed by employer and 
employee contributions. Governments that want to reduce redistribution in a pension 
insurance program are faced with the problem of financing existing entitlements and, if 
they continue the provision of redistributive benefits in another form, the problem of 
setting money aside for new entitlements. In Germany, the cost of financing child-care 
credits in the public-pension scheme from general taxes—as opposed to from employer 
and employee contributions—has exceeded €11 billion per year since 2001. In addition, 
in order to cover other non-contributory pension credits and payments, the federal 
government has transferred up to €50 billion per year to the pension-insurance program 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2008, 54). This case illustrates the problem resulting from a 
reduction of redistribution in an earning-related pension program: the emergence of a 
large funding shortfall which requires either an increase of general tax revenues or a 
reduction of benefits. 
 
Which institutional rules produce path dependence in the Korean pension system? 
Constraints on change exist in four retirement income programs: the NPS, the basic 
pension program, the civil servants’ schemes, and the severance payment scheme. The 
NPS has accumulated large pension entitlements since it uses primarily the pay-as-you-
go financing method and has received contributions for more than 20 years. The World 
Bank estimated that the NPS’ implicit pension debt ranged from 26 to 57 percent of GDP   31
in 2000 (Holzmann et al. 2004, 24). Using the World Bank’s projection model, the Korea 
Institute for Health and Social Affairs estimated that the NPS’ unfunded liabilities would 
rise from 47 percent to 140 percent of GDP between 2006 and 2050 (Yun 2007, 14). 
Thus, a large-scale privatization of the NPS would create prohibitive transition costs, and 
even a partial privatization of the NPS would be very difficult to finance. The NPS’ 
strongly redistributive benefit formula—which calculates pensions in part on the basis of 
average economy-wide earnings as opposed to individual ones—presents an additional 
barrier to a regime shift. Since the NPS is expected to serve as the key program for 
poverty prevention in old age, a shift from its partially redistributive formula to a purely 
earnings-related one would require a large transfer of funds from general revenue to the 
NPS. A massive expansion of the tax-financed basic pension program would be an 
alternative to refinancing the NPS, but this would generate high costs—mostly because of 
the basic pension program’s high coverage rate—and likely require higher taxes. 
Specifically, if basic pension benefits were to be raised to a poverty-preventing level and 
coverage were to be made universal, the projected costs in 2050 would increase from 1 
percent of GDP to about 7 percent of GDP (Moon 2008, 7; OECD 2007a, 122). In 
Korea’s special civil servants’ pension schemes, existing financing provisions make an 
integration in the NPS difficult; even though both employers and employees pay 
contributions, the government pays subsidies to these schemes because benefit 
expenditures exceed contribution revenues. Excluding employer contributions, annual 
subsidies were ￿1.5 trillion (more than $1 billion) in 2005 and are expected to increase to 
more than ￿30 trillion (more than $24 billion) by 2020 (OECD 2007a; Moon 2002). If 
the special schemes’ members were to join the NPS, the government would have to pay   32
for their existing entitlements but would no longer receive revenues from contributions. 
Like in the public-pension programs, in the occupational-pension system change is 
constrained by the double-payment problem: a full conversion of Korea’s unfunded 
severance payment schemes into externally funded occupational-pension plans would 
create high transition costs since companies that were to opt for conversion would be 
required to pay both workers’ accumulated entitlements to severance benefits and 
employer contributions to new pension funds. It is thus unlikely that a market alternative 
to the NPS would emerge in less than 10 or perhaps even 20 years. 
 
 
POLICY RESPONSES IN BISMARCKIAN PENSION SYSTEMS 
 
Path dependence and regime shifts in pension systems are not only influenced by macro-
causal factors—ideas, interests, and institutions—but also by micro-causal ones: the types 
and sequences of policy responses to social, economic, and demographic challenges 
(Weaver 2004; Bonoli and Palier 2007). Which policy responses are most likely to 
produce path dependence? A review of differences in the development of established 
Bismarckian pension systems is a starting point for answering this question: Canada and 
the United States maintained and, especially in Canada’s case, strengthened their 
Bismarckian-light systems despite fiscal pressures; Austria, France, Germany, and 
Sweden developed dominant Bismarckian programs and maintained them over many 
decades; since the 1990s, Germany and Sweden have shifted from the Bismarckian to the 
NDC system while Austria and France have defended their classic Bismarckian programs   33
even in the face of political and economic challenges. Did past policy responses and 
reform sequences influence these outcomes? This section reviews the principal reform 
options that are available in earnings-related pension programs, examines their likely 
effects on the long-term development of Bismarckian pension systems, analyzes policy 
responses in countries with mature pension systems, and suggests lessons for Korea’s 
evolving pension system. 
 
Four Types of Policy Options 
 
In order to achieve stability, Bismarckian pension systems need to change—they need to 
adapt specifically to economic and demographic challenges. Two design features create 
vulnerabilities that present difficult challenges for policymakers (Myles and Pierson 
2001; Schludi 2005; Weaver 2004): first, since most Bismarckian pension programs are 
financed from wage-based contributions paid by employers and employees, their finances 
are strongly influenced by changes in wage and employment growth; and second, since 
they operate either primarily or exclusively on a pay-as-you-go basis, they are affected by 
the reduction of the number of contributors and the increase of the number of 
beneficiaries in an aging population. Despite these vulnerabilities Bismarckian pension 
systems can be maintained over long periods of time—but only if they are frequently and 
effectively adjusted. For example, German governments reformed the earnings-related 
pension program a staggering number of times: they made more than 400 pension laws in 
the period between 1957 and 2006 (Ruland 2007, 32). Most of these adjustments were   34
effective, but a few weakened institutional stability and thus contributed to Germany’s 
shift to a quasi-NDC system in the early 2000s. 
 
Table 5 Types of Policy Options in Bismarckian Pension Systems 
 
 External  Internal 
Retrenchment  Eligibility Restrictions  Benefit Reductions 
Refinancing Contribution  Increases  Reserves Reductions  
 
Bismarckian pension systems offer policymakers a large number of refinancing and 
retrenchment options (Schludi 2005, 20-43; Whiteford and Whitehouse 2007; Weaver 
2003): to increase revenues, policymakers can increase the contribution rate, include 
previously uncovered groups, shift from contribution to tax financing, and create a tax-
financed basic pension that is separate from the earnings-related program; to reduce 
expenditures, they can increase retirement ages, shift from a final-salary formula to a 
lifetime-average-salary one, reduce non-contributory benefits, change the method of 
benefit indexation, and harmonize occupationally segmented schemes (Schludi 2005, 
Tables 1.2 and 1.3). To understand the effects of refinancing and retrenchment options 
better, let us assign them to the following four categories: eligibility, benefits, 
contributions, and reserves (see Table 5). The first category—eligibility— encompasses 
all options that change the definition of beneficiaries: the groups that are entitled to 
pensions and the conditions under which individuals qualify for benefits. For example, in 
order to cover funding shortfalls, policymakers can increase the retirement age or close 
early retirement pathways. The second category—benefits—consists of options that   35
change the calculation of benefits: reductions of the benefit level, changes in the 
valorization of past contributions, changes in the indexation of pensions, actuarial 
adjustments for early retirement, and reductions of non-contributory benefits, for 
example. The third category—contributions—includes not only increases in the 
contribution rate but also measures such as the introduction or expansion of transfers 
from general tax revenue, the extension of the liability to pay contributions to previously 
excluded groups, increases in the wage ceiling, and increases of transfers from other 
social insurance schemes such as health and unemployment programs. The fourth 
category—reserves—includes not only cash reserves or investments stored in a reserve 
fund but also “hidden” reserves that could be used in the event of a funding shortfall: an 
equalization of white-collar and blue-collar pension schemes and a conversion of special 
pension schemes for civil servants, for example. 
 
Political Constraints on Policy Change 
 
Pension policymakers have a broad range of options but often face political constraints. 
In the United States, for instance, the Republicans and the Democrats have a consensus 
that even a minor increase of the Social Security contribution rate should not be tolerated; 
this constraint was one of the reasons for the Bush administration’s proposal to partially 
privatize Social Security. In Germany, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats 
made the political agreement to prevent the pension contribution rate from exceeding 20 
percent up until 2020 and 22 percent up until 2030; this agreement was turned into a 
formal rule that, because it limits contribution increases, played an important role in   36
Germany’s shift from the Bismarckian to the quasi-NDC system. Since political 
constraints can lead to regime shifts, an analysis of their causes and of possible ways 
either to delay or to avoid them is critical. As a first step towards this analysis, 
policymakers’ likely political constraints in employing the four types of options—
eligibility, benefits, contributions, and reserves—can be examined. Since both an increase 
of the retirement age and an increase of the contribution rate affect labor markets and 
economic growth, pension policymakers can usually not make decisions on eligibility 
conditions and contributions without the consent of other key political actors such as 
economic policymakers and government leaders. But decisions regarding benefit cuts and 
the reduction of reserves usually fall within the jurisdiction of pension policymakers and 
tend to be supported by economic policymakers. Thus, pension policymakers face 
stronger political constraints in using external options—eligibility changes and 
contribution increases—than in using internal options—benefit and reserve reductions. 
 
In addition to being constrained by other policymakers, pension policymakers are 
constrained by citizens’ preferences. As opinion polls from many European countries 
have shown, retirement age increases and benefit cuts are the least acceptable options in 
pension reforms, and contribution-rate increases are the most acceptable option (Kohl 
2002). Policymakers are usually free to reduce reserves because, as Germany’s 
experience in the 1960 and 1970s and Canada’s experience in the 1980s and early 1990s 
have shown, the reductions go unnoticed. To conclude, pension policymakers are more 
constrained in using retrenchment options—a retirement age increase and benefit cuts—
than in using refinancing options—contribution increases and reserve reductions. By   37
making distinctions between external and internal options and between refinancing and 
retrenchment ones, one can rank the reform options by the expected strength of political 
constraints: eligibility restrictions likely lead to strong political constraints, contribution 
increases and benefit cuts to medium ones, and reserve reductions to weak ones. 
  
The sequences in which the four reform options are used are likely to influence the 
development of Bismarckian pension systems: if pension policymakers were to use the 
most constrained options before the least constrained ones, they would preserve political 
flexibility in responding to social, economic, and demographic challenges; however, if 
they were to use the least constrained options before the most constrained ones, they 
would limit their capacity to adjust a program effectively to projected or unexpected 
changes. Put differently, in the early stages of development, retirement age increases 
would be the best choice for maintaining adjustment capacity, and a reduction of reserves 
would be the worst one; both benefit reductions and contribution increases would be 
second-best choices. Differences in political acceptability affect not only policymakers’ 
general ability to use pension reform options but also their ability to implement changes 
in short order. Since retirement age increases are very unpopular among citizens and put 
occupational-pension arrangements under pressure, they need to be implemented 
gradually. Almost all countries that raised the retirement age delayed the start of 
implementation by several years and used a long transition period: in Germany, for 
example, the age increase from 65 to 67 years was delayed by 4 years and will be phased 
in over 18 years; in the United Kingdom, the age increase from 65 to 68 years was 
postponed by 18 years and will be implemented gradually over 22 years. The need for   38
gradual implementation is important also with regard to benefit reductions: benefit levels 
can be reduced only by slow and indirect measures such as changes to the accrual rate 
and to the indexation rule because citizens strongly oppose benefit cuts and because 
policymakers, for electoral reasons, do not want to reduce absolute pension amounts. To 
conclude, policymakers that seek to preserve adjustment capacity would be best off if 
they were to increase retirement ages and reduce benefits in the early stages of 
development. The use of contribution increases and reserve reductions is not as critical as 
the use of the other two options since the former are more acceptable and can be 
implemented without a long delay. 
 
Policy Responses and Path Dependence 
 
The development of the Canadian and German pension systems illustrate the effects of 
policy responses on institutional stability: Canada’s decisions—to allow early retirement 
only with actuarially reduced benefits, to index benefits only to inflation, to implement a 
large contribution increase, and to protect the reserve fund—contributed to path 
dependent development; Germany’s decisions—to allow early retirement with unreduced 
benefits, to index benefits to wage growth, to limit contribution increases, and to deplete 
the reserve fund—weakened institutional stability. Regarding the retirement age, 
Germany made a destabilizing decision in the early developmental stages: in the early 
1970s, it created a flexible—and very expensive—retirement option that allowed workers 
with 35 years of contributions to retire at age 63 with full benefits. In the late stages of 
development, it was very difficult to change these rules and partially reverse the long-  39
term trend toward early retirement (Ebbinghaus 2006). The German government’s 
decision to raise the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 years was made only after the 
shift from the Bismarckian to the quasi-NDC system had been implemented, and was 
thus made too late. Canada introduced the option of early retirement only in the mid-
1980s and applied relatively high actuarial deductions—6 percent per year—to early 
pension benefits, which largely protected the Canada/ Quebec Pension Plan from 
escalating costs generated by early retirement. Regarding benefits, Germany followed the 
principle of gross wage indexation, which had been the cornerstone of its 1957 pension 
system. In the 1970s and 1980s, this ambitious goal led to a rapid rise of pension costs 
and thus reduced the Social Pension Insurance’s capacity to adjust to economic and 
demographic changes. Since Canada had adjusted benefits in line with prices since the 
1960s, its indexation rule limited cost increases and contributed to long-term stability. 
 
Regarding contributions, Germany made stabilizing decisions in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The contribution rate was set at a high level: at 14 percent of wages in 1957 and at 18 
percent only a decade later. In the 1960s, Germany’s high contribution rate still produced 
small surpluses. But since partial pre-funding was not one of the program’s objectives, 
policymakers were able to spend excess revenues on new or improved benefits, for 
example the early retirement option with unreduced benefits. The German system 
received, in addition to contributions from wages, significant annual transfers from the 
federal budget which reimbursed the pension insurance scheme for the payment of non-
contributory benefits. These transfers contributed to path dependence and, because of a 
significant increase in the 1990s, briefly stabilized the Bismarckian pension system. Even   40
though the contribution rate of the Canada/ Quebec Pension Plan was only 3.6 percent in 
the 1960s, it produced surpluses that were saved in a dedicated investment fund, and this 
improved institutional stability. In the 1990s, Germany and Canada made different 
choices regarding contributions: Germany decided to keep the contribution rate at below 
20 percent, and thus barely above the level that had first been established in the late 
1960s, while Canada almost doubled its rate from 5.6 percent to 9.9 percent of wages. 
Germany’s introduction of a fixed ceiling for the contribution rate undermined path 
dependence but Canada’s steep contribution hike reinforced the path dependent 
development of its pension program and, because it was projected to increase the reserve 
fund from 2 years to more than 6 years of program expenditures, enhanced the program’s 
adjustment capacity in the long run. Regarding reserves, Germany made a very 
destabilizing decision in the early stages of program development: after 1967 it reduced 
the required size of its small reserve fund from 1 year to only 1 month of program 
expenditures. Thus, policymakers were no longer required to build up the fund to its 
previously required level and were free to spend most of the program’s accumulated 
reserves. Unlike Germany’s choices regarding the reserve fund, Canada’s stabilized the 
earnings-related pension program in the long run. In 1985, Canadian policymakers 
implemented a rule that was to protect the reserve fund: the contribution rate had to be 
increased if it was not sufficient for maintaining a reserve level equivalent to 2 years of 
program expenditures. In the mid-1990s, policymakers not only increased the required 
level to about 6 years of expenditures but also strengthened the fail-safe rule by 
mandating that, if the prescribed level should not be expected to be reached in the long   41
run and an agreement on reform could not be found, the contribution rate would 
automatically be increased and benefits would automatically be frozen (Little 2008, 249). 
 
Effects of Policy Responses in Korea 
 
Were the policy choices that Korean governments made in the NPS’ early development 
stage favourable or unfavourable to path dependence? Which future choices are likely to 
either reinforce or undermine the NPS’ path dependent development? The 1998 decision 
to increase the retirement age from 60 to 65 years will likely have a positive effect on 
path dependence. But since it will bring Korea’s normal age only up to the standard age 
in most OECD countries and its implementation will begin only in 2013 (and then be 
phased in over a 20-year period), its potential effectiveness in stabilizing the NPS has not 
been reached. An acceleration of the legislated age increase and a further increase from 
65 to 67 or 68 years—similar to that in Britain, Germany, and the United States—would 
improve the stability of the NPS in the long term. Even though the reduction of the NPS’ 
target replacement rate from 70 percent to 40 percent, legislated in 1998 and 2007, 
created the risk that Korea’s Bismarckian system might be transformed into a 
Bismarckian-light one, it was likely a stability-enhancing decision: it reduces financing 
pressures in the medium term (Moon 2009, Table 2) and does not rule out future 
increases of the benefit level. Korea’s choice of price, as opposed to wage, indexation of 
pension benefits will also contain costs in the long run. The contribution-rate increases, 
enacted in the 1990s, from 3 percent to 6 percent and from 6 percent to 9 percent of 
wages were important decisions that increased the likelihood of path-dependent   42
development. Nonetheless, even after its increase to 9 percent, Korea’s pension 
contribution rate continues to be very low compared to Austria, Germany and Italy’s 
which, respectively, were about 17, 14, and 16 percent of wages in the 1960s (Blöndal 
and Scarpetta 1998, 100). In order to avoid future financing problems, and reinforce the 
NPS’ path dependent development, Korean policymakers would need either to increase 
the contribution rate significantly—likely to more than 15 percent (Moon 2009, 18-19)—
or to introduce large transfers from general revenue. The initial decision to build up a 
massive reserve fund for financing NPS benefits was one of the most important steps 
toward creating a strong capacity for adjusting to economic and demographic changes. If 
policymakers were to make a commitment to permanent partial pre-funding—either by 
raising the retirement age or by increasing the contribution rate, or both—they would 





This paper has shown that, because of its many institutional layers, the Korean pension 
system could evolve into one of several different types of pension regimes: if the NPS 
were to continue to be dominant and occupational pensions continued to be marginal, a 
classic Bismarckian system would emerge; if the NPS were to be significantly reduced 
and occupational pensions were to be significantly expanded, a Bismarckian-light system 
would be the outcome; if other changes were to occur—such as the conversion of the 
basic pension into a universal, poverty-preventing pension and the partial replacement of   43
the NPS by a mandatory personal or occupational-pension scheme—a mixed regime 
would emerge. In addition, this paper has shown that these outcomes are not equally 
likely. Even though the Korean pension system is still maturing, there are many sources 
of path dependence that reinforce the Bismarckian path of development and make a shift 
to a different pension regime difficult. Large accumulated entitlements and the strong 
redistributive role of the NPS make it difficult to reduce the public, earnings-related 
pension program, and significant accumulated entitlements and the important role of the 
severance pay scheme in company financing also make it difficult to expand occupational 
pensions. The emergence and consolidation of a Bismarckian-style, single-pillar system 
is thus more likely than the shift to one of the variants of the multi-pillar system, such as 
the Bismarckian-light and the mixed regime type. Korea is at a crossroads but would 
have a hard time turning either left or right and, most importantly, seems to be looking 
straight ahead: income security has been an important idea and principle in Korean 
pension policy and is likely to continue to be important. Since the NPS is better able to 
provide income security than Korea’s underdeveloped occupational-pension plans, it will 
likely be the dominant pillar in retirement income provision. 
 
One of the key challenges for policymakers is the maintenance of the support from 
middle- and high-income earners. If the NPS replacement rates were to be inadequate for 
them, they would likely demand private alternatives; and if the redistributive role of the 
NPS were to continue to be very large, they would likely resist a significant contribution-
rate increase—which, in the face of Korea’s rapidly aging population, is absolutely 
necessary for reinforcing the NPS’ dominant role. A reduction of redistribution in the   44
NPS and an increase of the NPS’ earnings ceiling would likely not only increase support 
from middle- and high-income groups but also, in the long run, increase the volume of 
redistribution. There is a paradox of redistribution: “... the more we are concerned with 
creating equality via equal benefits to all, the less likely we are to reduce poverty and 
inequality” (Korpi and Palme 1998, 661). This is because very progressive programs 
reach their political limits of expansion much sooner than predominantly earnings-related 
ones. Even though strongly earnings-related programs redistribute a smaller percentage 
of funds than strongly redistributive ones, they tend to redistribute a larger overall 
amount and thus effectively reduce poverty and inequality in societies. Another key 
challenge for policymakers is the formation of a broad political consensus on the 
principles and goals of the Korean pension system. Since pension systems are difficult to 
change and critically shape the retirement plans of individuals and companies, pension 
policymaking needs to have a long time horizon and be based on the participation of, and 
agreement between, political parties, interest groups, and citizens. The experiences of 
Canada and Germany have shown that a broad consensus on pensions is the foundation of 
both a stable pension system and of a successful regime shift. 
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